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‘Free Speech is not Valued if only Valued 
Speech is Free’: Connolly, Consistency and some 
Article 10 Concerns
Paul Wragg*
This article suggests that different free speech principles apply in cases involving ‘journalists’ compared to 
‘non-journalists’, as in Connolly v. DPP. Strict principles apply when a journalist’s right to speak is 
threatened because the media exercise a valuable public watchdog role worth protecting even when compet-
ing interests exist. When non-journalists speak the same strict principles are absent even though speech of 
similar public interest may be involved. The justifi cation for allowing interference is that such extreme and 
unpopular speech is not suffi ciently valuable. This distinction, though superfi cially appealing, is troubling, 
not least because non-journalists might also act as public watchdog.
1. Introduction
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights,1 which is given domestic 
effect by the Human Rights Act 1998,2 declares that everyone has the right to freedom 
of expression.3 The Article itself is thinly worded both as to its substance and opera-
tion, which is entirely appropriate for a clause of supranational origin; it is for the UK 
judiciary to interpret and develop the clause according to the tastes and needs of the 
UK legal system and its people.4 Yet it remains debatable whether the principle behind 
Article 10 is being developed in a manner which shows that free speech is valued. 
Recently, it has been said that the UK judiciary’s approach to free speech ‘remains heav-
ily under-theorised’.5 In grappling with what is a large and complicated concept, the 
* Lecturer in Law, Durham Law School, University of Durham. The author is grateful to Professor Colin Warbrick 
and Dr Elizabeth Wicks, both of the University of Birmingham, for their helpful comments and encouragement with 
earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also to the anonymous assessor whose thoughtful comments and suggestions proved 
very useful. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 ‘the Convention’.
2 ‘the HRA’.
3 This article makes no distinction between the terms freedom of speech and freedom of expression. As Professor 
Barendt has noted, there is no evidence that courts draw any distinction between the two terms either, (Eric Barendt, 
Freedom of Speech, (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2005), 75).
4 It is acknowledged that this point is debatable and, certainly, the UK judiciary are not in total agreement with 
such a view, Lord Bingham in particular: see R (Animal Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport (2008) UKHL 15 and compare the judgments of Lord Bingham [37] with Lord Scott [44-45]. For an excellent 
discussion of s. 2, HRA and varying judicial approaches to it see: Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg?’, 
 European Public Law 11, no. 3 (2005): 405.
5 Ivan Hare, ‘Crosses, crescents and sacred cows: criminalising incitement to religious hatred,’ Public Law (2006): 
521, 526.
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judiciary has been accused of ‘baffl ing or, to be frank, obscure’ reasoning.6 The purpose 
of this article is not to chart the development of the principle or the general adequacy 
of its articulation so far since, given the complexity of free speech theory,7 the confi nes 
of an article would be unlikely to do justice to such an enormous task.
Instead, this article seeks to draw attention to two classes of speaker, which appear 
to have been created by the UK courts, for which two different standards of free speech 
right seem to exist. These speakers are termed, for the convenience of this article, the 
‘journalist’ and the ‘non-journalist’. By ‘journalist’ it is meant those reporting for the 
traditional print and television media, no distinction is made as to whether this is at a 
regional, national or international level. No such distinction tends to be made by the 
judiciary and neither do judges tend to specify what is meant by the term ‘media’ or 
‘press’ though, frequently, reference might be made to traditional forms of reporting 
and, likewise, the media parties involved in litigation tend to be from these traditional 
sources. ‘Non-journalists’ are those not classifi ed as members of the ‘media’ or ‘press’. The 
distinction is designed to highlight what this article argues are the dangers of classify-
ing everyone else, whether implicitly or explicitly, as ‘non-journalists’. It will be argued 
that those deemed ‘non-journalists’ do not enjoy the benefi t of the same free speech 
right as ‘journalists’. Yet this is a mistake, as it will be argued, since within this neglected 
category will be political pressure groups, concerned politically-minded individuals and 
the fast evolving culture of ‘bloggers’: ‘non-journalists’ who capture their thoughts and 
emotions about everyday issues and events on personal (or professional) websites. It will 
be argued that these non-journalists should enjoy the same free speech rights as journal-
ists since they too may contribute to the public watchdog role traditionally reserved for 
‘journalists’. Of bloggers, the actions of American blogger Mayhill Fowler prove that it 
is possible for individual non-journalists to command the attention of the public and 
meaningfully contribute to the public watchdog role despite the lack of comparable 
resources. It was Fowler, after all, who published Barack Obama’s comment from a fund-
raiser that neglected, small town working-class communities are ‘bitter’ and ‘cling to guns 
and religion’.8 Fowler’s report caused a media frenzy which opponent Senator Hillary 
Clinton sought to use to her advantage.9
The existence of these two classes of speaker will be highlighted by comparing 
two sets of cases, with particular reference to two decisions, involving the non-journalist 
expressing unpopular political ideas and the journalist reporting celebrity gossip. It will 
be argued that the present duality in approach that these cases suggest is a direct conse-
quence of free speech cases being determined, arbitrarily, on the value that the speech or 
speaker is said to have or serve. This practice is troubling since it tarnishes, if not defeats, 
6 Eric Barendt, ‘Free speech and abortion’, Public Law (2003): 580, 581.
7 For a cynical but useful view on whether the principle of free speech can ever be adequately expressed, see 
Paul Horton and Lawrence Alexander, ‘The Impossibility of Free Speech Principle’, Northwestern University Law Review 
(1983): 1319.
8 <www.huffi ngtonpost.com/mayhill-fowler/obama-no-surprise-that-ha_b_96188.html>.
9 For example see <www.nytimes.com/2008/04/14/us/politics/14web-seelye.html>.
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the unconditional term ‘everyone’ in Article 10 and yet this practice, if it is a conscious 
decision, does not seem to have been adopted for reasons that appear desirable or, even, 
developed. This article argues that, irrespective of the merits of the UK judiciary’s articu-
lation of free speech principle so far, Article 10 rights should be applied uniformly and 
consistently irrespective of the speaker’s identity or profession.
Before discussing these points, it is noted that some might say celebrity gossip 
claims and offensive political speech prosecutions do not bear comparison since the issues 
in each are so different. In the former, it is for the celebrity to put up a decent ‘privacy’ 
claim under Article 8 before the media must defend itself under Article 10. A spate of 
recent cases has seen the celebrity unable to do so, thus the free speech claim (and its 
nature) is not explored.10 This may be contrasted to the latter where establishing the free 
speech claim is pivotal. Likewise, in the celebrity gossip claim, where the Article 8 claim 
is viable, it is for the judiciary to balance two competing but equal rights11 and since 
privacy is also regarded as a concept that is not yet fully articulated12 it is perhaps to be 
expected that some unusual decisions may occur as the interplay between the terms is 
explored and mapped out. With offensive political expression, the competing aspect is 
likely to be the public interest in protecting morals, preserving social order or the ever 
vague ‘rights of others’13 exception rather than some other Convention right. Likewise, 
the operation of penal legislation in such cases should not be overlooked. Perhaps this 
makes a difference.
Yet if the right to freedom of speech applies to all then it should be the case that 
the same principles appear in every decision concerning Article 10, regardless of what is 
said and who says it, otherwise the claim, inherent in the word ‘everyone’, that the right 
to free speech is uniformly applied appears doubtful. Consequently, every Article 10 case 
should bare comparison. Naturally, the argument put here is more sophisticated than 
simple fi xation on the word ‘everyone’; it will be argued that the principles of Article 10 
should be applied consistently. Decisions involving celebrity gossip and offensive political 
speech make for an interesting comparison since the principles expressed in those cases 
appear isolated and provide stark contrast, suggesting that the imbued value of the speaker 
or speech is critical to the decision. Thus, it will be argued, there is a skewed treatment at 
work in which the importance of the journalist’s free speech right is exaggerated whilst 
the non-journalist’s is neglected. There may be good reason why Article 10 in the UK 
10 John v. Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 1611 (QB); Murray v. Express Newspapers Plc [2007] EWHC 1908 
(Ch); [2007] EMLR 22.
11 See, for example, Lord Hope, in Campbell v. MGN [2004] 2 AC 457: ‘the effect of these provisions [Article 8 and 
10] is that the right to privacy which lies at the heart of [the action] has to be balanced against the right of the media 
to impart information to the public. And the right of the media to impart information to the public has to be balanced 
in its turn against the respect that must be given to private life’. [105].
12 See, for example, Gavin Phillipson, ‘Judicial reasoning in breach of confi dence cases under the Human Rights 
Act: Not taking privacy seriously’, EHRLR Supp (Special Issue) 1 (2003); Brian Pillans, ‘Thus far and no further. Are we 
saying it loud enough?’ Comms. L. 12, no. 6 (2007): 213; Angus MacLean and Claire Mackey, ‘Is there a law of privacy 
in the UK? A consideration of recent legal developments’, EIPR 29, no. 9 (2007): 389; Richard Caddell, ‘Privacy and 
confi dential documents – the ‘secret’ diary of Prince Charles: Associated Newspapers Ltd v. His Royal Highness the Prince of 
Wales’, Comms. L. 12, no. 2 (2007): 68.
13 See discussion below.
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should be developed in this way but those reasons are neither forthcoming nor obvious. 
Instead, it seems we are without a developed free speech principle, which after eight years 
of the HRA is most disappointing.
2. Connolly v. DPP14
In the recent case of Connolly, a sole protester lost her appeal against conviction for 
sending graphic pictures of aborted foetuses to three pharmacies which stocked the 
‘morning after’ pill. This behaviour was found to be ‘grossly offensive or indecent’ by 
the Crown Court and so prosecution under the Malicious Communications Act 1988 
followed. The Divisional Court, dismissing the appeal, found that the right of Mrs Con-
nolly under Article 10(1) to express her deeply held belief that abortion was murder did 
not outweigh the ‘rights of others’ exception in Article 10(2), including the pharmacy 
workers’ ‘right not to have sent to them material of the kind that she sent when it was 
her purpose, or one of her purposes, to cause distress or anxiety to the recipient’.15
The outcome of this appeal is consistent with those in ProLife,16 Hammond,17 
Norwood,18 and Percy,19 which also involved suppression of (and, in most, conviction for) 
‘insulting’ expression. Yet, though the court found the behaviour insulting, and mostly 
for manifest reasons, in each there was clear political behaviour involved that should not 
be overlooked. In Connolly and ProLife, the expression concerned abortion. In Hammond, 
it concerned homosexuality. In Norwood, it was immigration and/or national security 
fears and, in Percy, it concerned the American armed forces in Britain. Whilst in Norwood 
and Hammond the views expressed were particularly odious and in Connolly and ProLife 
shocking such reasons ought not to prohibit free speech protection, as European Court of 
Human Rights decisions have encouraged20 (though not, necessarily, implemented).21
14 [2007] EWHC 237 (Admin).
15 Ibid., [28].
16 R. (ProLife Alliance) v. British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] UKHL 23; [2004] 1 AC 185: See Eric Barendt, ‘Free 
Speech & Abortion’, supra, n. 6.
17 Hammond v. DPP [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin), The Times, 28 Jan. 2004 in which a street preacher was convicted 
for speeches and signs that conveyed the message homosexuality was morally wrong. See discussion in Andrew Geddis, 
‘Free Speech Martyrs or Unreasonable Threats to Social Peace? – ‘Insulting’ Expression and s. 5 of the Public Order Act 
1986’, (2004) PL 853.
18 Norwood v. DPP [2003] EWHC 1564, The Times, 30 Jul. 2003, in which conviction followed for the display by 
a BNP regional organizer of a poster in the front window of his house depicting the image of WTC in fl ames with the 
words ‘Islam out of Britain’ and ‘Protect the British People’ contained within it. See discussion in Geddis, supra, n. 17, and 
also Ivan Hare, ‘Crosses, crescents and sacred cows: criminalising incitement to religious hatred’, (2006) PL 521.
19 Percy v. DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 1125; [2002] Crim. L. R. 835 in which a sole protestor was convicted for 
standing on an American fl ag (her own) in front of a vehicle carrying American servicemen. Whilst her conviction was 
quashed on appeal, it was not done so because her protest was reasonable but rather because the Divisional Court had 
misdirected itself in its proportionality test including its failure to consider ‘that the accused’s behaviour went beyond 
legitimate protest’ instead being ‘a gratuitous and calculated insult’. See discussion in Geddis, supra, n. 17.
20 The principle from Handyside v. UK [1976] 1 EHRR 737 is that Art. 10 applies to material that shocks and/
or offends.
21 See Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria [1995] 19 EHRR 34; Handyside, ibid., where applications involving ‘shocking 
and/or offending’ material were defeated because, essentially, the material was shocking and/or offending. Though see, 
more recently, the decision in Malisiewicz-Gasior v. Poland [2007] 45 EHRR 21.
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In Connolly, the Divisional Court were satisfi ed that Article 10(1) applied, on the 
basis that:
the sending of photographs … was not the mere sending of an offensive article: the article con-
tained a message, namely that abortion involves the destruction of life and should be prohibited. 
Since it related to political issues, it was an expression of the kind that is regarded as particularly 
entitled to protection by Article 10.22
However, the interference was justifi ed under Article 10(2) because it was (i) prescribed 
by law by the Malicious Communications Act 1988; (ii) was in furtherance of a legitimate 
aim, that is, the rights of others; and, (iii) was necessary in a democratic society.
In ProLife it was found that the ‘legitimate aim’ requirement is not limited to ‘strictly 
legal rights’,23 which explains why the House of Lords had no concerns with, effectively, 
inventing one. The idea was expounded that the ‘rights of others’ concept ‘is capable of 
extending to a recognition of the sense of outrage that might be felt by ordinary mem-
bers of the public who in the privacy of their homes had switched on the television 
set and been confronted by gratuitously offensive material’.24 This principle was applied 
in  Connolly. Restriction was necessary because, despite her plea to the contrary, Mrs 
Connolly was found, at fi rst instance, to have intended to cause distress and anxiety.25 
Therefore, Mrs Connolly’s ‘right to express her views about abortion does not justify the 
distress and anxiety that she intended to cause those who received the photographs’.26 
Further, Dyson LJ, delivering judgment, noted that ‘of particular signifi cance is the fact 
that those who work in the three pharmacies were not targeted because they were in a 
position to infl uence a public debate on abortion’.27 Expanding on this point, he noted, 
in any event, even if the three pharmacies were persuaded to stop selling the pill, it is diffi cult to 
see what contribution this would make to any public debate about abortion generally and how 
that would increase the likelihood that abortion would be prohibited’28…‘disseminating mate-
rial of this kind to a number of pharmacists because they sell the ‘morning after pill’ is hardly an 
effective way of promoting the anti-abortion cause.29
3. A v. B plc30 and Similar ‘Celebrity Gossip’ Cases
Despite the passage of six years and some doubts expressed on certain aspects of it, the 
Court of Appeal decision in A remains an important source of free speech principles, 
certainly for interim relief applications, and, as has been said recently, ‘it is right that it 
should be accorded consideration and respect’.31 Here, the Court, led by Lord Woolf, 
22 Connolly, supra, n. 14, [14].
23 ProLife, supra, n. 16, [91].
24 Ibid.
25 Connolly, supra, n. 14, [4].
26 Ibid., [32].
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., [31].
30 [2003] QB 195.
31 John, supra, n. 10, [8].
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endorsed the type of strong principles that any free speech advocate would welcome. Yet, 
even for the advocate, it is perhaps troubling that they were used to ensure the world 
knew of, (then) Premiership footballer, Garry Flitcroft’s extra-marital affair with two 
women.
In making its decision, Flitcroft’s chief concern that the article would have an 
immediate and devastating effect on his wife and young family was found to be some-
thing the Court was in no position to rule upon.32 The Court found that ‘the degree of 
confi dentiality to which A was entitled, notwithstanding that C and D did not wish their 
relationships with A to be confi dential, was very modest’.33 Therefore, although a prima 
facie privacy claim might be made at full trial, it was not convincing that such would 
justify suppressing the free speech claims of B, C and D.34 The Court resisted the notion 
that details of the affair were not in the public interest, noting that: 
it is not self-evident that how a well known premiership football player...chooses to spend his 
time off the football fi eld does not have a modicum of public interest. Footballers are role models 
for young people and undesirable behaviour on their part can set an unfortunate example.35
The Court also found the viability of the media as a commercial entity to be  relevant. It 
stressed, ‘the courts must not ignore the fact that if newspapers do not publish informa-
tion which the public are interested in, there will be fewer newspapers published, which 
will not be in the public interest’.36
The principal doubts expressed on this case may be said to relate to the defi nition 
of public interest used, the notion of ‘involuntary role model’ that was applied and the 
relevance of the media’s commercial viability to the decision. Arguably, Lord Woolf ’s 
low level application of ‘public interest’ is unsustainable given the decision in Jameel,37 
in which the House of Lords considered the meaning of the term in the context of the 
qualifi ed privilege defence to a defamation claim. Their Lordships noted that this defence 
stems from the general obligation of publishers to report matters of real public interest 
which the public has a general entitlement to receive. As Baroness Hale suggests, the test 
of ‘public interest’ is not of a minimal standard in these circumstances:
a real public interest…is very different from saying that it is information that interests the 
public – the most vapid tittle-tattle about the activities of footballers’ wives and girlfriends interests 
large sections of the public but no one could claim any real public interest in our being told about 
it.38
32 A, supra, n. 30, 217.
33 Ibid.
34 Of C and D, the Court commented that ‘although … we would not go so far as to say there can be no confi -
dentiality where one party to a relationship does not want confi dentiality, the fact that C and D chose to disclose their 
relationships to B does affect A’s right to protection of the information. For the position to be otherwise would not 
acknowledge C and D’s own right to freedom of expression,’ ibid.
35 Per Lord Woolf, ibid.
36 Ibid., 208.
37 Jameel v. Wall Street Journal [2006] 2 AC 465.
38 Ibid., [147].
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A universal application of this approach has much to commend it, not only from a 
privacy perspective in that it would protect citizens (not just ‘celebrities’) from fanciful 
public interest claims by journalists but also from a free speech stance since, as Jameel 
confi rms, a matter of real public interest permits certain false statements to made as long 
as the test of responsible journalism has been met.39 It would be a lot less pressing to 
insist such inaccuracies were justifi able if the public interest test was of a lesser degree.
A differently composed Court of Appeal in McKennitt40 suggested that role model 
status, and the enhanced levels of responsibility that it is said to bring, is inappropriate 
for those who fi ercely guard their privacy with ‘the iron safeguard of a chastity belt’41 
as Ms McKennitt did. The Court in McKennitt,42 also doubted the soundness of both an 
‘involuntary role model’ principle43 and the view ‘that weight must be given to the com-
mercial interest of newspapers in reporting matter that interests the public’.44 That aside, 
the fi nding in A that media ‘exposure is legitimate to demonstrate improper conduct or 
dishonesty’45 holds good. In A, Lord Woolf also stated that 
any interference with the press has to be justifi ed because it inevitably has some effect on the 
ability of the press to perform its role in society. This is the position irrespective of whether a 
particular publication is desirable in the public interest.46 
Eady J, a leading high court judge and, seemingly, fi rm proponent of greater privacy 
protection in the law,47 recently described this view as a ‘general statement of law that 
39 This test requires the media to demonstrate that reasonable steps had been taken to verify the publication. See, 
in particular, ibid., [111-112] and [137].
40 McKennitt v. Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714.
41 Ibid., [6], per Buxton LJ.
42 Ibid., [60]-[66].
43 Ibid., [65].
44 Ibid., [66].
45 Ibid., See, for example, Campbell, supra, n. 11, where Naomi Campbell had acted immorally by lying about her 
involvement with drugs and by being hypocritical in her condemnation of other models that did use drugs. That she was 
photographically captured attending a Narcotics Anonymous meeting, where she sought help for her troubles, redeemed 
her position enough to split the House of Lords decision in her favour. Ultimately, the moral value of her rehabilitation 
would seem to have outweighed the media’s moral crusading in exposing her hypocrisy. By contrast, Ms McKennitt had 
not ‘behaved disreputably or insincerely in any way’ and so succeeded in her claim (McKennitt, supra, n. 40, [68], Buxton 
LJ affi rming the fi rst instance fi nding of Eady J.). Likewise, in HRH Prince of Wales, the intended publication of His Royal 
Highness’s journal, detailing his private thoughts on the handover of Hong Kong to China, did not outweigh the privacy 
claim since ‘there was no question of exposure of any kind of wrongdoing or of hypocrisy’ in publication (HRH Prince 
of Wales v. Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1776, [137]).
46 A, supra, n. 30, 205.
47 Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd (2008) EWHC 1777 (held, no genuine public interest in clandestine sensa-
tionalist reporting of FIA chief ’s sexual proclivity); P v. Quigley (2008) EWHC 1051 (held, no conceivable public interest 
in allowing M, an individual, to write a ‘fi ctional’ account detailing sexual antics of P & Q, two other individuals); Prince 
Radu of Hohenzollern v. Houston (2007) EWHC 2735 (held, free speech claim failed because journalist had not written a 
balanced account and had made serious allegations without the opportunity to respond being given); CC v. AB (2006) 
EWHC 3083 (an injunction granted to prevent disclosure of an adulterous affair; there was not necessarily any genuine 
public interest in the story and it was relevant that wife was acting out of spite or in revenge) cf. A v. B plc, supra, n. 30; 
X v. Persons Unknown (2006) EWHC 2783 (injunctive relief granted to a couple in public eye going through marriage 
diffi culties), McKennitt v. Ash, (2005) EWHC 3003 (QB) (in which he found for Ms McKennitt, a decision reaffi rmed on 
appeal, see discussion above). Incidentally, although not an Art. 8 decision, Eady J decided against Wall Street Europe Sprl 
in the fi rst instance decision of Jameel (2004) EWHC 37, fi nding, instead for the prominent Saudi Arabian businessman 
and his company who had been accused by the Defendant of being monitored by the central bank of Saudi Arabia in 
case funds were transferred to terrorist organizations.
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remains valid’.48 Thus, the success of the media’s free speech claim may not depend on 
establishing a public interest: ‘in other words, it is not necessary to demonstrate, in the 
case of a tabloid publication in particular, that the contents of an article or the content 
of photographs is desirable in the public interest’.49 Therefore, the question of public 
interest would seem to be a double-edged sword for the media. Whilst the absence of 
public interest does not (necessarily) affect the free speech claim (though it may assist 
the privacy claim), the presence of public interest most likely strengthens it (whilst also 
weakening the privacy claim by the same degree).
4. The Practice of Judgments Based on Value
In approaching the question of permissible interference, the European Court of Human 
Rights endorses what has been called a taxonomical approach50 to free speech in which 
speech is classifi ed in a hierarchical fashion. At the top of the list is political expres-
sion followed by artistic expression then commercial expression. The European Court of 
Human Rights is content that differing standards of justifi ed interference may be applied 
to each.51 Yet, as Lord Hoffmann has made clear in In Re McKerr, in interpreting and 
applying the Convention rights, ‘their meaning and application is a matter for domestic 
courts, not the court in Strasbourg’.52 The UK judiciary, therefore, has the opportunity 
to develop the free speech principle in such a way that it does not decide cases based 
on arbitrary value determinations of the speech or speaker involved. As A and Connolly 
(and other cases involving unpopular speech) suggest, the UK judiciary is yet to avail 
themselves of this opportunity. Amongst other reasons, it should seek to do so since the 
practice of attributing a value to speech behaviour is manifestly unsafe. The value that 
an audience, any audience, may derive from speech behaviour will vary and, therefore, 
there is a signifi cant danger that the judiciary’s estimation of that value does not represent 
all the manifold assessments that the audience may make. Thus, how can the judiciary 
be sure that its assessment of value is, in any way, reliable? It has been said by American 
scholar Cass Sunstein that ‘it is impossible to develop a system of free expression without 
making distinctions between low and high value speech, however diffi cult and unpleasant 
that task may be’.53 The truth of this observation has been severely doubted by others54 
but, regardless, it may be said that given the unreliability of an approach to free speech 
based on value, the UK court should consider more thoroughly whether an alternative 
48 John, supra, n. 10, [8].
49 Ibid.
50 Tony Martino, ‘In conversation with Professor Eric Barendt: hatred, ridicule, contempt and plain bigotry’, 
 Entertainment Law Review (2007): 48, 51.
51 For example, see Casado Coca v. Spain (1994) 18 EHRR 1. See also, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, Law of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, (Butterworths, 1995), 397.
52 In re McKerr [2004] 1 All ER 1049, [65].
53 Cass. R. Sunstein, ‘Low Value Speech Revisited’, Northwestern University Law Review 83 (1989): 555, 557.
54 In particular, see Larry Alexander, ‘Low Value Speech’, Northwestern University Law Review 83 (1989): 548.
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approach would be desirable. In any event, it may be said that whatever system is adopted, 
it should be applied consistently.
It may also be questioned whether, in making such judgments based on value, the 
UK courts are consistently approaching the issue from the same perspective. In a case 
like A it would seem that the court had the readers’ (or audience’s) perspective (as well 
as the speaker’s) fi rmly in mind, whilst in a case like Connolly, it would seem that the 
bystander’s perspective55 was dominant.56 Admittedly, the question of which perspective 
should govern the judiciary’s development of Article 10 is a more complex issue than 
can be discussed in this article but, in any event, it may be said, likewise, that whichever 
perspective is considered critical, that perspective should be applied consistently. This is 
in keeping with the wording of Article 10, which protects the right to receive information 
in addition to the right to distribute it. However, the approach undertaken in Connolly 
suggests this right to receive is limited to information that the audience wishes to receive 
which seems somewhat at odds, facially at least, with the idea that Article 10 extends to 
material that shocks and offends57 especially in the context of political speech.58 Article 10 
thus contains an inner confl ict between speaker and audience and makes the question of 
which interest should dominate (the speaker’s or audience) an important one to decide. 
In one sense, the confl ict is diminished if the audience interest is not used in 
competition with the speaker’s but, instead, is used to bolster it. However, such accom-
modation further emphasizes the division between popular and unpopular speech so that 
popular speech enjoys the benefi t of (potential) extra protection based on the audience’s 
willingness to receive whilst unpopular speech gains no such protection. Thus the audi-
ence impact may swing accordingly from a positive justifi cation to protect speech under 
Article 10(1) to a negative justifi cation to interfere with it under Article 10(2) based on 
whether the audience appreciates what it hears or not. This has an obvious, direct bearing 
on how robustly the principle of free speech can be protected.
It may be said that since the recipients in Connolly were members of an unwilling 
audience they could be considered ‘bystanders’. Admittedly, the impression of detachment 
inherent in the term ‘bystander’ may seem at odds with the facts of Connolly since the 
pharmacy workers were not detached from the speech but, rather, were the target of it. 
However, given that the term ‘bystander’ in a free speech context is applied to those who 
hear ‘speech’ without necessarily wishing to, the label may be accurate. Thus in  Connolly, 
it would seem the bystander’s third party interest was given greater consideration than 
the speaker’s, unlike in A. An argument in favour of the audience and bystander interests 
being diminutive of the speaker’s is advanced below.
55 See discussion of bystander interests in Thomas Scanlon, ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’, in The Philosophy 
of Law, ed. R. M. Dworkin, (OUP, 1977), 153, (which, coincidentally, follows an article by J. Finnis entitled ‘The Rights 
and Wrongs of Abortion’, 129).
56 For a useful discussion of how free speech theories may be constructed according to these competing perspec-
tives, see Barendt, Freedom of Speech, supra, n. 3, 23-30.
57 Handyside v. UK [1976] 1 EHRR 737.
58 E.g, Gunduz v. Turkey [2005] 41 EHRR 5.
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The reference to consistency in the above points does assume that the judiciary 
are not applying the free speech principle consistently at present. Admittedly, this charge 
needs to be answered. Ignoring, for the moment, any differences in procedural issues 
involved, it is submitted that the principles of free speech expressed in the cases  discussed 
above are markedly different. Though it may be said that a value is placed on the speech 
in each instance, perhaps the clearer impression gained is that the journalist would seem 
to have a more robust right than the non-journalist, for reasons that will be outlined 
shortly. Yet, assuming for the moment that this is true, it is unclear why this should be so. 
Article 10 gives no special standing to the media and neither does European jurispru-
dence. Indeed, in Steel and Morris v. UK59 the government’s argument that the Applicant 
protesters against McDonald’s restaurants should not attract the high level of protection 
afforded to the media on account of being non-journalists was rejected by the European 
Court of Human Rights as irrelevant.60 Admittedly, the European Court of Human 
Rights has said much about the vital role that the media has in society as a public watch-
dog, as in Jersild v. Denmark,61 and more recently Tonsbergs Blad62 but it tends to make 
such statements in circumstances where journalists are imprisoned or fi ned for reporting 
on matters of genuine public interest (as in Jersild, where the journalist was convicted 
and required to pay a fi ne or else be imprisoned) and not, as Steel and Morris confi rms, in 
order to make some distinction between journalists and non-journalists in its interpreta-
tion of Article 10. Thus the Court gives no special status to journalists within the term 
‘everyone’. This assessment bears some comparison with the pre-HRA UK approach. In 
Spycatcher, Sir John Donaldson MR was forthright on the point:
I yield to no one in my belief that the existence of a free press…is an essential element in 
 maintaining parliamentary democracy and the British way of life as we know it. But it is impor-
tant to remember why the press occupies this crucial position. It is not because of any special 
wisdom, interest or status enjoyed by proprietors, editors or journalists. It is because the media are 
the eyes and ears of the general public. They act on behalf of the general public. Their right to 
know and their right to publish is neither more nor less than that of the general public.63
Likewise Bingham LJ (as he then was) stated, in the same case, ‘neither the press nor 
any other medium of public communication enjoys (save for exceptions immaterial for 
present purposes) any special position or privileges’.64
The rhetoric of A, as reiterated in John,65 suggests that any interference with a 
journalist’s exercise of free speech must be justifi ed because it will inevitably have some 
effect on their ability to act as public watchdog (‘the A principle’). If there is no special 
status for journalists then it should be that this principle can be applied universally. In the 
following sections, a number of points will be made to test this assertion and so discuss 
59 [2005] EMLR 15.
60 Ibid., at [89].
61 [1995] 19 EHRR 1.
62 Tonsbergs Blad as and Haukom v. Norway (2008) 46 EHRR 30, [82].
63 Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 183.
64 Ibid., at 218.
65 Supra, n. 10.
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what impact the consistent application of the A principle would have for non-journalists’ 
free speech right. In doing so, it will be argued that the A principle should be applied 
consistently and, thus, the common law should not be developed to give journalists a 
special status under Article 10. To make these points, it will be considered, fi rst, whether 
it may be said that the fi rst part of the A principle – that any interference must be 
 justifi ed – already operates for non-journalists and so whether it is misleading to suggest 
some distinction is operating; second, and linked to this fi rst point, whether the reference 
to ‘public watchdog’ renders application of the A principle to the non-journalist inap-
propriate; and, third, whether the operation of certain procedural issues require different 
treatment for the journalist and non-journalist.
4.1. Interferences must be justifi ed
It is, fi rst, useful to explore a potential rejoinder that application of the A principle would 
have no bearing on the outcome of a case like Connolly. In A, the interference with the 
media’s free speech was not justifi ed though it could be said that this was due to the facts 
not the principle behind it and had the facts permitted otherwise (e.g., if they had been 
closer to those in Campbell66) then an interference with the media’s free speech may have 
been justifi ed. In Connolly, the interference with Mrs Connolly’s expression was justifi ed 
because she had acted in a manner that deeply offended and/or disturbed a number of 
people. Thus, there is no distinction operating between the right of Mrs Connolly and 
newspaper B; Mrs Connolly was not deprived the right to free speech but the right to 
behave in a harmful way. So where is the problem?
The problem, so to speak, is with the identifi able though largely unspoken assump-
tions and perceptions which frame the court’s approach to these free speech cases and, 
thus, promotes a different treatment of journalists compared to non-journalists. It is sub-
mitted that the infl uence of these assumptions and perceptions about each individual’s 
Article 10(1) right underpins the method by which judges reach their determinations on 
the applicability of Article 10(2). These assumptions and perceptions, at work, manifest 
themselves, for the media, in the grandiose term ‘public watchdog’. This gives the jour-
nalist a certain advantage: the media is a public watchdog and, thus, an important speaker. 
Any interference affects the journalist’s ability to act in this way and, thus, the qualities 
of the particular news item are irrelevant to determining whether this interference is 
justifi ed. This value is attributed directly to the journalist (not his output) but there is 
no equivalent consideration applicable for the non-journalist. 
Naturally, the notion that the quality of the journalist’s speech is irrelevant is an 
important principle. Yet the decisions in Connolly and ProLife appear most troubling 
because they suggest that the quality of the speech (or speaker) is relevant when deter-
mining the right for non-journalists. In Connolly, for example, the court thought it 
66 Supra, n. 11.
122 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW
important to say that Mrs Connolly’s speech could not have achieved the ends she 
intended. Thus the quality of the speech was relevant to the justifi ability of interfering 
with it. This is in stark contrast to A, where the Court found quality to be a matter 
for the consumer not the court.67 This aspect of the decision in Connolly, in particu-
lar, should not sit well with the free speech advocate. The guiding principle should be 
that if the speaker chooses an ineffective method to speak, by yelling from some lonely 
outcrop, that is entirely a matter for them. Instead, it seems that, when considering the 
justifi ability of interference, a different, higher standard applies for journalists compared 
to non-journalists.
Yet, it may be argued, the interference in Connolly had little to do with quality 
(despite the Court’s reference to it) and, instead, related to the willingness of the observer 
to view the images. As noted above, the ‘audience’ in Connolly were unwilling specta-
tors who had had the images thrust upon them. This may be compared to a journalist’s 
audience who, in buying a newspaper, say, are actively seeking to receive the journalist’s 
views. In the event of interference, the argument can be put that there are different 
considerations involved when protecting an unwilling audience and depriving a willing 
one. This is a valid point. Yet the differences between the two types of recipient seem 
superfi cial. Consumers of the media may have tacitly accepted, through their freely-
made decision to purchase, the risk of encountering information that shocks or offends 
them. The recipients of Connolly’s information made no such choice. Yet those willing 
consumers of the media may argue that their decision does not rob them of their sen-
sibilities or opportunity to object. Consider the individual who turns on the television 
midway through a harrowing report containing a series of shocking images. Though the 
consumer has agreed to expose themselves to information by switching the television on, 
there can be no implication of clairvoyance to know how that information will appear 
and whether shock or offence will follow.
Yet there are sound reasons why the media should – perhaps must – provide  shocking 
images if the context requires it as they seek to inform the public of ‘the truth’. There 
is no real benefi t to insisting upon sanitized news-reporting; the arguments in favour of 
sanitization to protect the public would give licence to propaganda and misinformation. 
Likewise, a mature democratic society is expected to have a strong constitution in order 
to make informed decisions on complex moral issues such as crime, war and health 
(including abortion).68 Thus, it is in the public interest to be informed, which weakens 
objections by citizens who feel upset following exposure to such images. It is the right of 
such individuals not to participate in the democratic process (or part of it) and thus that 
right is secured by their ability to switch off once they have formed their objection. Hav-
ing made this point for the media, on the basis of the public interest in informing society, 
regardless of whether that society wishes to be informed or not, then it seems plausible 
67 See discussion below (n. 75).
68 See, for example, Lord Hoffmann’s speech in R v. Central Independent Television plc [1994] Fam 192 discussed 
below.
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that the same argument can be made for the non-journalist. In those circumstances, the 
citizen has the same right not to listen and can freely choose to ignore the information 
they are presented with. There is a difference between being forced to endure prolonged 
exposure of disturbing information and the choice to disengage following indignation 
at the initial receipt. Once Connolly’s actions were clear to the pharmacies affected her 
communications could have been ignored.
4.2. Relevance of the Public Watchdog Function
A further reason why this higher standard for interfering with media speech appears 
unsafe is that it overlooks or else ignores the capacity of the protester – or any non-
 journalist – to act as public watchdog. Whilst in Connolly the court acknowledged in 
passing that Mrs Connolly’s behaviour was political expression, it did not examine 
whether this imbued Mrs Connolly with the same, or similar, type of public watchdog 
status that she, presumably, would have had had she been a journalist.69 In such circum-
stances, it is hard to see how her speech would have been denied Article 10 protection if 
printed in a newspaper (which would have reached, and so affected, a great many more 
people than workers at three pharmacies). Further, the argument may also have been put 
that a mature democratic society is capable of tolerating the type of shock and offence 
that results from such speech (as above). Admittedly, the court may still have denied 
protection but given European Article 10 jurisprudence (e.g., Jersild, Tonsberg Blad) that 
outcome is not pressing and, arguably, it would have involved a fi ner balance than was 
evident in Connolly.
The argument may be put that non-journalists may also act as a public watchdog 
or public conscience and so the importance of free speech is not peculiar to the media. 
Though the media can reach a higher proportion of the public (perhaps), including those 
in a position to affect change, than the individual can, the media may also decline to 
pursue particular causes because it is not expedient, fi nancially or politically, to do so. The 
media do not necessarily represent the public in their views. Though, in one sense, the 
media should be seen as independent and so able to report as they see fi t, inevitably they 
are driven by market forces, which surely taints their claim to independence. Further, is 
it still appropriate that the media be considered an adequate representative of the public’s 
voice? If the populace should maintain a healthy scepticism about what government says, 
it should also treat a corporate-driven media in the same way. Thus, the populace should 
be no more inclined to trust the media than the government. Accordingly, the populace 
requires equal free speech protection for the non-journalist in order to preserve its integ-
rity and independence of thought, ideas and information. A robust system of free speech 
does not require the media to be given disproportionate protection; it requires unpopular 
speech to be given protection. As the dissenting judges in Otto-Preminger lamented, ‘there 
69 E.g., as in Jersild, supra, n. 61, and Tonsbergs Blad, supra, n. 62. See discussion above.
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is no point in guaranteeing this freedom only as long as it is used in accordance with 
accepted opinion’.70
Also, of the ability of the individual to reach a large audience, the role of notoriety 
should not be overlooked. Offensive and shocking material may provide the non-journalist 
with a platform that would otherwise have been unavailable had the speech been ano-
dyne. This is particularly important for political behaviour. Despite the suggestion by the 
court, a letter from Mrs Connolly to her local MP would not necessarily have resulted in 
the media attention for her cause that she did attract using shock tactics; if anything, this 
approach would have been more ineffective than her actions. In any event, the notion of 
‘effectiveness’ cannot be confi ned to participation in actual political debate. Take the man 
standing in front of the tank in Tiananmen Square.71
4.3. Procedural differences in determining these cases
Yet what of the procedural differences apparent in celebrity gossip cases and offensive 
political speech? Do they necessitate some distinction between the types of speaker? As 
noted, in the former, demonstration of the privacy claim is a prerequisite. For the latter, 
typically the appellant court is hamstrung by matters of fact decided at fi rst instance, 
including determinations of intention and whether the behaviour was offensive enough 
to engage the penal legislation. Additionally, prosecutions that require legislation to be 
interpreted in accordance with Convention rights raise the politically sensitive issue of 
compatibility; this is not an issue typically present in celebrity gossip cases. It is not over-
looked that in Connolly, penal legislation was in operation. Yet this should not affect the 
points raised in this article. If the court were to fi nd that such legislation interfered with 
its ability to apply free speech principles consistently then it should issue a declaration 
of incompatibility72 if it cannot read the legislation compatibly.73 For both categories, 
precedent may also dictate the result. 
Arguably, these matters of procedure can and must be swept away (though, of course, 
precedent could only be done so at the appropriate level). Section 6 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 requires rights to be applied in a manner consistent with the Convention by 
each level of the court. As Geddis has argued, rather than apply the usual  Wednesbury 
unreasonableness test, the appellant courts should ensure ‘the lower court has applied 
the correct interpretation…and not merely reached a reasonable decision on the matter’.74 
Diffi culties with the term ‘reasonable’ are particularly pronounced in free speech cases, 
especially those involving unappealing speech, since it may always appear reasonable to 
70 Per Judges Palm, Pekkanen and Makarczyk, Otto-Preminger, supra, n. 21, [3] of their dissenting judgments.
71 It could be said this example somewhat contradicts the argument made above since it was the mass media that 
brought this image to popular attention, without which it would have been an ineffective message, perhaps. However, 
equally, it could be said that it was entirely because the protestor’s action were so dramatic that the media were interested. 
Had he stood forlornly holding some banner, it is highly unlikely the media would have been interested.
72 Section 4, HRA 1998.
73 Section 3, HRA 1998.
74 Geddis, supra, n. 17, 867.
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deny protection to such speech because others are offended, shocked or insulted as a 
consequence but, arguably, that ‘reasonableness’ does not make the decision correct.
5. Applying the A Principle to Connolly
If it may be said that it is appropriate to construe the A principle for the non-journalist, 
the following considers whether such application would have affected the outcome in 
Connolly.
First, the form of speech would be an irrelevant consideration, as it is for the media. 
As the Court in A concluded: 
once it is accepted that the freedom of the press should prevail, then the form of reporting in the 
press is not a matter for the courts but for the Press Complaints Commission and the customers 
of the newspaper concerned.75
Yet how might this analysis apply to the non-journalist since, admittedly, such are not 
subject to scrutiny by the Press Complaints Commission. This is an important point 
although how critical it is may be doubtful given that the ability of the PCC to 
effectively scrutinize and discipline the media (where necessary) is often criticized as 
inadequate.76 Newspaper customers are the media’s audience as are anyone who hears 
the non-journalist’s speech. Like the customer, the non-journalist’s audience can choose 
to ignore that speech if it disapproves. Admittedly, in Connolly it was not just the form of 
speech but the level of distress and anxiety caused that tipped the balance. Also, it may be 
said that the recipients were not able to ignore the speech because they were an unwit-
ting audience. This too is an important point, and not one that should be easily dismissed, 
though of the distress and anxiety caused by exposure, the approach taken in A provides 
an interesting comparison. Here, Garry Flitcroft argued that publication would cause 
unnecessary distress and anxiety to his wife and children. In dismissing this concern, Lord 
Woolf endorsed Lord Hoffmann’s analysis in the Central Television case:
Publication may cause needless pain, distress and damage to individuals or harm to other aspects 
of the public interest. But a freedom which is restricted to what judges think to be responsible or 
in the public interest is no freedom. Freedom means the right to publish things which govern-
ment and judges, however well motivated, think should not be published. It means the right to say 
things which ‘right-thinking people’ regard as dangerous or irresponsible.77
It is fair to say these words appear hollow in the context of Garry Flitcroft’s sexual antics 
but they appear hollower still in light of Connolly. Applying this principle to Connolly, it 
could have been said, arguably, that societal membership demands a strong constitution 
for even graphic images if they have political content.
Admittedly, the graphic, shocking and unexpected nature of Connolly’s speech 
cannot be easily dismissed. It could be said that Connolly should have adopted a more 
75 A, supra, n. 30, [48].
76 See Louis Blom-Cooper, ‘Press freedom: constitutional right or cultural assumption?’, Public Law (2008): 260.
77 Central Independent Television, supra, n. 68, 204.
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responsible approach to delivering her message and perhaps should have directly 
approached the media to report on her protest (or her local politician as the court 
suggested). Yet, the second point that might be made is that such an argument suggests 
the non-journalist must exercise their free speech right in a particular, restricted, way. 
Although this position may appear akin to that of the journalist, (who would also be at 
the whim of his/her editor as to whether publication occurred) arguably, such a require-
ment weakens the notion of free speech for the non-journalist more than the journalist. 
The media would have been under no obligation to listen to Mrs Connolly (she may 
have been dismissed as a crackpot) whereas a journalist would be better placed (though 
not guaranteed) to have their story seriously considered. Whilst on the one hand it may 
be concluded this is consistent with the principles of free speech since it is not a right 
to be heard or a right to demand that protests are actioned, on the other, it is troubling 
that a protesters outlets for free speech purposes may be so constrained. 
Third, of the distress and anxiety caused, the judgment suggests some qualitative 
difference between sending the letters to pharmacies and doctors or politicians instead. 
The basis of this seems obscure. In favour of it, it could be said that doctors have stron-
ger constitutions for this type of material whilst politicians, as the European Court of 
Human Rights has acknowledged, are taken to have sacrifi ced certain sensibilities in 
exchange for public offi ce. However, the logic of this position is not entirely compelling. 
First, if it is permissible for pharmacy workers to object these images then it is diffi cult 
to understand why doctors and politicians cannot either. European case law confi rms 
that politicians have a more limited right of objection to speech than others do when 
they accept public offi ce78 but the principle is usually deployed where politicians object 
to offensive comments about their reputation and seems rather less appropriate should 
they object to speech that is offensive per se and has no connection to their reputation. 
Second, on a practical issue, it should not be overlooked that mail sent to doctors and 
politicians will undoubtedly be opened by a receptionist or secretary. Likewise, an opera-
tive in the post room could have opened the letters in the event Connolly had sent them 
to the newspaper. In practical terms, it is diffi cult to see the difference between those 
operatives and the pharmacy workers. 
Yet, had it been a newspaper or television station that had displayed these images 
there would have been less scope for arguing that the distress and anxiety to be caused by 
the images would justify their suppression. In such circumstances, the court could have 
applied the principle from the Court of Appeal decision in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v. Central Broadcasting Limited,79 where Sir Thomas Bingham MR (as he was 
then) held that it was unnecessary for the families of the victims of a convicted serial 
murderer to fi nd his interview in a TV documentary distressing since ‘all that anyone 
has to do is switch off the programme’,80 particularly as it contained an introductory 
78 As Malisiewicz-Gasior, supra, n. 21 reiterates.
79 (1993) EMLR 253.
80 Ibid., 271.
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warning that some viewers may fi nd the content troubling. Likewise, though it may seem 
counterintuitive, the argument that distress and anxiety would follow from viewing such 
images would diminish where the image was put before a larger audience since a greater 
range of responses and reactions could be envisaged.
6. An Undeveloped Approach to Free Speech
It is important to note, though, that this argument is not intended to say that 
Mrs Connolly, ProLife or anyone else should be permitted to show deeply disturbing 
images to whoever they like. It would be abhorrent to suggest they should. Instead, the 
argument is put that interference with the exercise of the right should be done on a 
consistent basis so that the same standard applies to the journalist and non-journalist. 
Determining cases by measuring or attributing a value to either the speech or speaker 
is inappropriate and, moreover, is inconsistent with that system. Thus, it is disappointing 
that these principles, from Connolly and A, may be developed in future cases as promot-
ing some rudimentary cost benefi t analysis approach to deciding free speech rights. 
Judges may assume that the value identifi ed either in, or despite, the effect of the speech 
is determinative. In this way, the journalist will enjoy the benefi t of a wide margin on 
account of their ‘public watchdog’ status unless there is something particularly unwhole-
some about their behaviour81 whilst the protestor may be forced to self-censor, especially 
where their speech is generally held to be unappealing, since the value of shocking or 
offending a great many people will rarely, if ever, be thought to be valuable. Yet the 
word ‘everyone’ demands equal treatment and so the same principles must apply in all 
Article 10 cases. It is one thing to have a system of free speech, available to all, which is 
controlled by rules or standards that may appear too relaxed, too restrictive or somewhere 
in between. For such a system it becomes a matter of argument whether the level of 
control exercised by the State is appropriate or not. It is altogether a different affair to 
have a system that applies relaxed rules to some individuals and restrictive rules to  others, 
so that some individuals are permitted to speak freely but others not, by reference to 
some overarching argument that value or values are served to society at large by such 
distinctions. The wording of Article 10 suggests the former system should apply but its 
application, certainly in the UK, evokes the latter.
If the case is to be made for this skewed treatment then the reasons for its appro-
priateness in the UK seem largely unarticulated and, where they are barely articulated, 
they seem outmoded or else opaque. The argument that celebrity gossip should be 
protected under a free speech clause on account of its connection to the media’s role as 
public watchdog remains largely elusive. It seems premised on the idea that the media 
require such fl exibility in order to promote their investigative prowess to uncover cor-
ruption, deception or immorality in those that hold power, wealth or fame. Thus, to deny 
81 E.g., as in Campbell, supra, n. 11.
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journalists in a particular instance would affect, in a detrimental manner, their overall 
capacity to expose corruption etc., when it counts. Yet, whilst this may be convincing 
to some – though surely only in principle – it remains diffi cult to see how a Garry 
Flitcroft-type individual fi ts in. Of course, it is not forgotten that this principle comes 
with the caveat that journalists should not overstep the mark,82 and may be stopped from 
doing so, but then we can be assured that they are unlikely to do so on many occasions 
since the mark seems readily capable of being washed away and redrawn somewhere else 
whenever the circumstances call for it. So whilst the exposure of illegal drug-taking is 
past the mark, if done in a manner that is too insensitive,83 that same mark seems to dis-
appear where extra-marital affairs – morally but not legally reprehensive behaviour – of 
the rich and famous are involved.84 Admittedly, the analysis can be spun differently but 
these are fi ne distinctions that are ultimately built around the idea that a free press – 
another unarticulated principle by which the Judiciary tend to mean traditional media 
sources – requires this infl ated power because it acts as a public watchdog. Yet, this idea 
is in danger of becoming outmoded since it overlooks both the increase of media outlets 
that have little or no obvious or identifi able interests in pursuing a public watchdog out-
look –  particularly the magazines that focus solely on celebrity gossip – and it neglects 
increasing concerns over the commercial viability of the printed media as it battles 
against internet and 24-hour television stations as the preferred news source for many 
people. Of this last point, arguably, newspaper editors may feel unable to devote as many 
column inches to political comment and debate if it is thought that celebrity gossip or 
commercial advertising will generate more sales. The capacity to act as public watchdog 
may be compromised as a consequence and thus the idea that any interference affects 
their ability may be misplaced.
Further, in Connolly and ProLife since the message was of a political nature, greater 
consideration should have been had to the principle that participation in a democratic 
society requires toleration of opposing views even where they are received as shocking 
and offending. This is a factor which should transcend any need for effectiveness. As 
Baroness Hale noted in Campbell, 
some [types of speech] are more deserving of protection in a democratic society than others. Top 
of the list is political speech. The free exchange of information and ideas on matters relevant 
to the organisation of the economic, social and political life of the country is crucial to any 
democracy.85
If freedom of expression extends to behaviour that is shocking and/or offensive how is 
this to be realized as a right unless offensive political behaviour (in particular) is pro-
tected? As Scanlon has noted, freedom of expression requires ‘a good environment for the 
82 Jersild, supra, n. 61.
83 Campbell, supra, n. 11.
84 A, supra, n. 30.
85 Campbell, supra, n. 11, [148].
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formation of one’s beliefs and desires’86 so that ideas and information may be cultivated 
and exchanged; it does not require ring-fencing so that only popular, orthodox or ano-
dyne ideas and information are protected. The UK courts should heed the warning from 
Strasbourg that ‘there is little scope under Article 10(2) of the Convention for restrictions 
on political speech or on debate on questions of public interest’.87 Though the European 
Court of Human Rights noted that contracting states have a certain margin of apprecia-
tion in assessing whether a ‘pressing social need’ exists to justify interference, the court 
stressed that ‘it goes hand in hand with European supervision [that] the [European] 
Court is … empowered to give the fi nal ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ is reconcilable 
with freedom of expression’.88
It is recognized that an important argument for affording the media a wide margin 
is that otherwise the courts may appear too heavy-handed, causing a ‘chilling effect’ on 
speech, thus unduly restricting editorial freedom and affecting the media’s public watch-
dog role. It would not be in the public interest if editors felt inhibited when placing 
stories concerning matters of genuine public concern. Yet, it may be said that if this is a 
relevant judicial consideration then there must be an equally pressing and corresponding 
principle that if the court is too heavy-handed in prosecuting those who voice political 
concerns (albeit using less than courteous methods) then more people may be dissuaded 
from passionate dissent for fear of the consequences, which would also not be in the 
public interest. Though one might be tempted to be dismissive of why unpopular speech 
should be protected, it is important to note the argument that ‘free speech is of value, 
precisely because it enables radicals to challenge established orthodoxies and received 
wisdom, including our conventional understandings of what is tasteful and decent’.89 At a 
general level, it is troubling that the court may deny protection for speech it dislikes and, 
moreover, it is troubling that it may apply a different set of rules for the media compared 
to the individual for reasons that are not entirely clear.
7. Conclusion
It is not enough to say that the media remain an outlet for the Connolly-type protestor 
who wishes to publicize their cause. There is no guarantee that the media will show any 
interest in a story and it is probably more accurate to say that the media’s interest in such 
a story depends entirely on whether they can see a spin or side to it that will suit their 
(ultimately, fi nancial) interests. Yet protesters like Connolly, who have passionate views on 
subjects deeply important to them, will still want to have their say regardless of whether 
the media (or doctors or politicians) are receptive to assisting them. In order to gain 
public attention, if that was her aim, it is no wonder protesters like Connolly resort to 
86 Thomas Scanlon, ‘Freedom of expression and categories of expression’, University of Pittsburgh Law Review (1979): 
519, 527.
87 Malisiewicz-Gasior, supra, n. 21, [57].
88 Ibid., [58].
89 Barendt, Free Speech and Abortion, supra, n. 6, 590.
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drastic shock tactics that are likely to grab the public’s attention, if only through infamy. 
Naturally, this is not to say that Connolly’s actions were the paradigm example of free 
speech but, rather, that the public interest inherent in her cause ought not to have been 
so apparently impotent to her free speech claim. It would not have been so easily ignored 
if she had been a journalist.
This article has sought to show that, at present, there is a duality operating in free 
speech cases where the free speech right of journalists enjoys a higher level of resistance 
to justifi able interference than the right of the non-journalist. An overarching solution 
to the problem is for the UK to determine and implement a fully theorized approach to 
free speech principle. However, this solution will not be easily achieved. As noted, it is 
beyond the scope of this article to articulate such, not least because it is a complex task 
that is not aided by the persistent disagreement within the global academic community 
of how that theory would appear. Yet this disagreement is largely irrelevant since it does 
not matter that global academics disagree; it only matters that the UK is able to agree on 
a unifi ed approach for immediate implementation. Whether this is the judiciary’s task, the 
executive’s or Parliament’s is, perhaps, debatable. Given that free speech stems from the 
common law, and may return to it if the next government repeals the Human Rights Act 
1998 without replacing it, arguably, the judiciary are not just the best placed to deal with 
this but are the only government branch to be trusted with the task. Admittedly, some 
may fi nd this solution inconsistent with our Parliamentary democracy. Yet the inadequa-
cies and, frankly, dangers of allowing the democratic majority to determine the limits of 
permissible speech have long been recognized: as Mill said, 
I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their govern-
ment. The power itself is illegitimate. If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only 
one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justifi ed in silencing that 
one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justifi ed in silencing mankind.90
The shape of free speech, therefore, must remain exclusively the judiciary’s domain. It is 
their duty to protect it. Admittedly, it may be overly optimistic to expect the judiciary 
to agree absolutely on how that unifi ed principle may appear. The Court of Appeal and 
House of Lords decisions in ProLife91 evidence the signifi cant differences between judges 
on free speech principle. Yet, should it remain in force, the effect of the Human Rights 
Act 1998, arguably, is that it requires the judiciary to act as a quasi-constitutional court 
when determining cases involving Convention rights. From that perspective, the onus 
is on the judiciary to focus on the development of these Convention rights and the 
constitutional issues in their application rather than be lead, say, by statutory interpreta-
tion and application. Though it may be a diffi cult task to formulate a unifi ed principle, 
it should remain their task.
A more focused solution to the problem highlighted by this article is to sug-
gest that the UK judiciary adopt, as an initial step to a unifi ed principle, a consistent 
90 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, (London: Routledge, 1991), (1st edn, 1859), 28.
91 Supra, n. 16.
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approach when determining Article 10 cases so that the principles applied are universal 
to  journalists and non-journalists. This does not require acceptance that, particularly, 
odious political expression has value (it is not hard to argue that it does not) but rather 
requires recognition of the problem: if the concept of free speech is to be valued then 
there is no place for judgments based on value. This may require a cultural change. It 
may require recognition that the need for media outlets to maintain their fi nancial 
viability may compromise, or it may focus, their effectiveness as public watchdogs. Into 
this void, should it appear, may step the non-journalist – be that the political pressure 
group or the politically concerned individual or ‘blogger’ – each of whom may also be 
equally valuable public watchdogs. These individuals may wish to say things that others 
do not want to hear, not least because they are not an orthodox source of information. 
As Lord Denning once said, it may appear there is no public interest to be served in 
publication ‘but this is where freedom of speech comes in. It means freedom, not only 
for the statements of opinion of which we approve, but also for those of which we most 
heartily disapprove’.92 Until that idea is consistently upheld it will remain the case that 
free speech is not valued when only valued speech is free.
92 X (A Minor) (Wardship: Restriction in Publication), Re (1975) Fam 47, 58.

